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Introduction
Ask anyone who was resident in the black locations along the Reef in
the 1940's and 1950's what the main sources of violence and insecurity at
that time were and the chances are that they will answer either 'the
tsotsis1 or 'the Russians' [amaRashea] or both.* A scan of the newspapers
and archival record of the period confirms those residues of popular memory.
Reporters, location superintendents, location advisory boards, and police
commandants all regularly reported on the periodic 'reigns of terror1 which
erupted out of a normally turbulent and disordered life on the Reef, in
which blanketed Russians or more stylishly attired youth were principally
involved.
Yet besides the bare listing of clashes, casualties, police engagements
and trials that we find in the written record, remarkably little is known
about the origins, motives or wider political significance of either group.
In the case of the Russians this was at least partly due to the closed and
secretive nature of the group. Throughout this period, and subsequently,
they took great pains to disguise and misrepresent the objectives and
activities of their gangs, elevating deception of the police, in particular,
to a fine art. Before long, the magistrates who presided at their
innumerable trials, and the prosecutors by whom they were arraigned seem to
have simply given up trying to find out what the underlying causes of these
clashes were, and to have contented themselves with the tale fed to them by
the Russians that they were the outcome of 'a conflict between two
sub-chiefs in Basutoland'.
For both sides this was a highly convenient fiction. In the case of
the Russians it permitted them to cast themselves in the role of rough and
simple traditionalists pursuing a time-honoured and unfathomable feud. For
the authorities it allowed them to drop the vexed task of explanation.
However bloody their feuds, they were all rooted in an obscure and distant
past, reassuringly disconnected from the realities of modern day urban life,
and the mass politics that they were beginning to spawn.
The disappearance of the Russians in the historical record must,
however, be explained by factors other than the gullibility or apathy of
contemporary observers. They did, after all, make a definite impression on
the times, yet they have been all but erased from subsequent historical
writing. This may in part be attributed to the general failure in South
African historigraphy up until the last fifteen years to pay much attention
to the black experience but it also reflects a tendency among a later
generation of historians, including those most concerned with the plight and
the struggles of the disenfranchised majority, to focus principally on the
more forward looking black nationalist movements- and the activities and
utterances of their mostly educated leaderships. It is only comparatively
Today another prime candidate for this role might well be the police.
However, in the period under discussion, despite the constant harassment of
pass, permit and beer raids carried out by the police, informants of all
political and other persuasions, repeatedly offer the same unsolicited
remark: 'in those days the police didn't shoot you'.
- 4 -
attributed to the refusal of the Basotho to pay admission to a dance
organised by the Mpondo. On this occasion the casualty list read, four dead
and 25 injured, two critically. It was out of this increasingly turbulent
and fractious environment that th Russians (and Japanese) were born in mid
1947.
Thenceforth the pace of conflict quickened. A major battle between the
two gangs in August 1947 was followed by a series of skirmishes in the first
half of 1948. In October these spilled over into a wider"ethnic conflict
between the Russians and a section of the Xhosa residents of Benoni's 'Tent
Town', leaving two dead and 27 injured, 12 critically.
At this stage a new, though hardly foreign, element was grafted onto
Benoni's Russo-Japanese hostilities. Hitherto both Russians and Japanese
had recruited members from all areas of Basutoland; now the whole basis of
gang membership was transformed. Some time towards the end of 1948 a fund
was either created or replenished among the Russians for the purpose of
helping gang members 'in trouble'. The occasion may well have been the
need to assist those arrested in the aftermath of the Russian/Xhosa clash in
October of that year. Russian co-founder Mabiloko Mohlapo was given custody
of the fund. At around the same time Nathaniel Lihloka arrived in Benoni,
having been ejected from Jabavu.
According to a statement later volunteered by Mabiloko to the police
Lihloka now set about sowing suspicions about Mabiloko's custodianship of
the money, which came to a climax at a meeting in March 1949 when Lihloka
suggested that half (or all) of the fund be placed in the charge of Russian
co-leader Mohau Massau. At this or a subsequent meeting it was also
proposed that the Matsieng and Molapo components of the Russians split,
which in fact was what happened a few days later when Mohau of the Matsieng
was attacked and seriously injured by Molapo assailants. From this point
on a bitter feud set in, which in one form or another has persisted till
this day.
While Lihloka probably played some part in fomenting the dispute, the
split did not simply hinge on matters of personality and ambition, as
Mabilako sought to suggest. Mabiloko was an acknowledged master of
deception and disinformation in his dealings with the police - on this
occasion he disingenously divulged to them that Lihloka and his chief
lieutenants were 'notorius criminals' in contrast, presumably, to his own
blameless following - and there were a range of other tensions emerging
within the ranks of Benoni's Russians which Lihloka could as easily have
been articulating as orchestrating. Foremost among these were long-standing
rivalries between different localities and sections of the Basotho in
Basutoland. Samuel Pelanyane, for example, talks of early (pre-Russian)
fights in Benoni being like 'traditional games' between different locally
based sections of Basotho migrants, and other testimony points in the same
direction. As time went on some of these assumed a more pervasive and
intractable character, especially those between the Molapo, Masupha and
Matsieng sections of the Basotho from north, north-central, and south
central Basutoland respectively, [each of which areas had been granted out
to different sons of Moshoeshoe I in the mid nineteenth century]. The
conflict which broke out among the Basotho of Vereeniging and Evaton between
1944-7, for example, followed these lines. Beginning when 'People from
Peete's place used to beat young men from my (Hlalele's) village in
Basutoland1 it gradually broadened until Hlalele and his Matsieng faction
had to seek refuge in Newclare, where they later came to constitute the most
violent and predatory Russian gang of them all.
It seems hardly conceivable that similar rivalries did not lurk below
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the surface of Benoni's Basotho community, providing fertile ground on which
Lihloka could work.
A second and more immediate source of conflict among Benoni's Russians
centred on the administration of the fund which had been placed under
Mabiloko's control. What Mabiloko and other Russians had neglected to
mention to the police when they had confided in them their opponents
transgressions was that the principal purpose of the fund was to bail out
Russians arrested by the police for robbery, public violence and murder and
to provide them with the best and least principled legal counsel available.
As we shall see later on in this paper very large sums were collected for
these purposes whose disposition even in the most propitious of
circumstances was likely to evoke suspicions. In Mabiloko's case these
hardened into firm conviction after a group of Benoni's Russians were
despatched early in 1949 to recover Hlabatusi's wife who had absconded to
Kroonstad with a lover. This group was arrested for trespass on the evening
of its arrival before it was able to carry out its mission, and immediately
summonsed headquarters in Benoni to furnish the necessary money to provide
admissions of guilt/or bail. Help was quickly forthcoming but was,
according to Isaac Mogkape, dispersed on a patently discriminatory basis,
with the bulk of Molapo being bailed out and many Matsieng being left to
languish in gaol. This not surprisingly 'caused hard feelings, and
manifested itself in the conflict between'the Molapo and Matsieng'.
Almost identical reasons underlay an equally convulsive split between Sotho
and Hlubi Russians in Newclare early in JL952 which will be the subject of
closer analysis later on in this paper.
Once this factional polarisation had taken place it quickly spread to
all other areas where Basotho migrants and immigrants were congregated and
where the same latent rivalries were present. 'Shortly after my arrival in
Newclare, battle erupted between the Matsieng and Molapo factions' Hlalele
recalls, and the same pattern reproduced itself in Pimville, Orlando,
Moroka, Evaton and most other parts of the Reef. By the early 1950's there
was scarcely a Reef township that was untouched by the fighting, which very
often reached extraordinary intensity, involving up to 1 000 combatants at
any one time. The following list gives some idea of the extent of conflict
in Newclare which was one of the areas where the fighting was worst (see
Table I).
While fighting between the rival Basotho factions continued to absorb
most of the energies of the Russians, the rest of the black population of
the Reef by no means escaped unscathed. At one point or another Russian
gangs seem to have collided with or molested virtually every identifiable
section of the Reef's black urban population, but the two groups with whom
they most conspiculously and regularly clashed were 'Nguni' speaking migrant
workers, and those sections of second generation black urban residents whom
the Russians could associate with tsotsis or city slickers. In Benoni's
Tent Town a fresh round of disturbances broke out between the Russians and
Tent Town's Xhosa inhabitants in August 1949, while in October 1950 a bloody
and celebrated clash took place between the Russians and Zulu migrant
workers from Benoni hostel and the Dunswart Iron and Steel Works which has
acquired epic and almost legendary proportions in the recollections of
Benoni's black residents of the time. Elsewhere, in December 1951 a fight
broke out at Orlando shelters between the Russians, and Zulu and other
supporters of Mpanza in which 10 people died and 152 were injured, while in
September 1955 pitched battles between Russians and Zulu migrants in Dube
and Meadowlands townships around Dube hostel left 40 people killed and
scores more seriously injured. These, it may be added, account for only
the most celebrated episodes which were so gory or violent that they were
forced to the attention of the authorities or the press. Countless other
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TABLE I: RUSSIAN CLASHES IN NEWCLARE 1953-1957
Number of Number of
Date Police Russians Dead Wounded Arrested
Involved Involved
25. 8.53
4. 5.54
19. -5.54
30. 5.54
13. 6.54
4. 7.54
22. 9.54
6.10.54
20.10.54
21.10.54
25.10.54
30.10.54
5. 6.55
12. 6.55
18. 9.55
27.11.55
3.12.55
7. 2.55
9.12.55
9. 9.56
7.12.56
25.12.56
30.12.56
30.12.56
17. 1.57
20. 1.57
23. 1.57
23. 1.57
27. 1.57
3. 2.57
10. 2.57
Total fights
50
36
62
39
17
61
90
42
24
69
47
22
53
30
26
5
18
32
16
43
11
16
3
23
3
18
18
12
19
31
153
1 079
1
1
1
11
200
150
100
100
40
200
400
500
200
500
700
200
400
000
200
70
300
400
300
800
200
100
300
500
30
500
200
000
000
500
20
110
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
1
9
9
8
6
11
4
14
3
1
5
5
14
5
5
2
4
4
26
5
13
4
3
5
19
39
30
87
345
13
11
24
8
26
8
31
30
62
3
2
2
1
3
26
250
ethnic skirmishes studded this period which only careful research can
unearth, breeding attitudes of deep apprehension and resentment among much
of the Reef's migrant population.
Other groups who found themselves caught up in brawling encounters with
the Russians were sections of the Reef's more settled urban population. The
Russians harboured a deep-seated antipathy for urban youth, whom they
generally equated with tsotsis and whom they viewed as being without culture
or principle. The Russians' prejudices, though misguided, were not entirely
without foundation. Benoni, ex-tsotsi, P.P., for example, recalls
'When you see a migrant worker having a long stick on his shoulder
and haying all his necessary possessions other job seekers would rob
him. '
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and this was an attitude that the Russians understandably resented. Whether
on the streets or the trains they were thus prone to take reprisals against
those whom they took to be tsotsis, and often not in the most discriminating
fashion, so that hapless urban workers could sometimes find theselves
victims of unprovoked assaults'
A further point of friction with the urban population was the Russians'
practice of levying contributions from their constituents to meet their
legal costs. The indications are that this practice, having started in
Benoni in 1948, spread itself to Pimville, Newclare and probably elsewhere
on the Reef in the course of the same year. These collections lent
themselves easily to abuse. Rantoa recalls
'At the beginning we would ask this money from Basotho only. Later
we realised that we were protecting the people of different ethnic
groups who were not contributing to the collections. Then the
collection was extended to everybody who stayed in the same area
irrespective of ethnicity.'
On the basis of this kind of rationale all Basotho, all those married
to Basotho or the entire population in a given area could find themselves
subject to such demands. Those refusing were liable to experience eviction,
robbery or assault. In January 1950, for example, a group of Russians
were reported as forcing their way into the houses of residents of Moroka
East, demanding protection money and assaulting their inhabitants. Again
in May of the same year 1 000 residents of Pimville assembled to protest
about the same kind of depredations by Russians. Similarly, in December
1950, the Molapo faction of the Russians were reported as terrorising
Benoni's Tent Town residents and demanding money for those arrested after
the murder of a white police sergeant in Tent Town earlier that year,
while in May 1952 500 residents of Newclare South were forcibly evicted by
Hlalele's Matsieng faction following their refusal to continue to pay into
Hlalele's fund.
A clamour of protest rose up as such practices became more regular and
prevalent, culminating in an anguished memorandum being sent by the Joint
Advisory Boards of Johannesburg's locations to the Ministers of Justice and
Native Affairs in February 1951. The crime situation it asserted
'has now reached a climax. The extent of the reign of terror among
the African people whether in the house, in the street, in the train
or bus, or whether in day time or night time cannot be adequately
expressed. Men, women and children are not safe and live in constant
fear of loss of life and/or property as a result q£ the activities of
these Russian, Japanese and/or tsotsi gangsters.'
In a number of areas an outraged citizenry sought to band themselves
together in civilian guards to resist the twin menaces of tsotsis and
Russians. Civilian guards had been sanctioned by the government in 1942
when it was confronted by a mounting crime wave in the urban areas and a
depleted police force drained by the demands of the war. Such bodies
were, however, always regarded with a certain degree of suspicion by the
police who saw them as a potential power base for local warlords, and
political brokers , and even criminals, who could as easily use them to
subvert the order they were supposed to maintain. The latter,
predictably, was the view the Russians found convenient to hold. In
Newclare where the Russians and Civilian Guards first seriously squared up
against each other, the Russians claimed that the Civilian Guard had been
infiltrated by tsotsis who were using it as a cover for indiscriminate
attacks on anyone speaking Sesotho or wearing a blanket. In February 1952
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the Russians retaliated and a vicious vendetta soon ensued which divided
Newclare into two warring parts: Newclare South (Sitekekeng) where the
Basotho lived and the Russians held sway, and Newclare North over which
(especially) Tswana and Zulu speakers, and in general a more settled urban
population, had secured control. Further conflicts between the Russians
and civilian guards flared up elsewhere on the Rand, most notably in
Germiston in 1955, while what was in many ways an analagous clash erupted
during the Evaton bus boycott of 1957. All of these, moreover, acquired
ethnic and political inflections, which will be discussed in the final part
of this paper.
An Explanation
As the foregoing survey should have shown, the Russians were an
exceptionally violent and dislocative presence on the Rand. The question
which this obviously prompts is 'why was it Basutoland specifically that
produced such a group?'. This is something that cannot be answered in
isolation. Particular features of the Russians appear to be associated with
particular aspects of Basotho society, but to establish these connections
with any certainty, it is necessary to look at other labour exporting areas
of southern Africa to ascertain whether similar structures or experiences
yielded similar results, or whether different combinations of factors
produced similar features to those displayed in the Russian gangs. Such an
exercise is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is debatable whether the
data for such an exercise yet exists. All that is attempted in this section
are, therefore, a few partial but hopefully suggestive comparisons.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature about Basotho workers in this
period is that they were experiencing a transition from migrant to immigrant
status. Statistics reveal a sharply climbing number of Basotho migrants to
South Africa in the middle decades of the century (see Table II) but fail to
disclose the number that had been absent for lengthy periods of time or had
finally severed their links with the land.
TABLE II: BASOTHO MIGRANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA 1921-1956
Year Males Females
Source: Murray,
1921
1936
1946
1956
Families Divided
37
78
95
112
. P-
827
604
697
790
4.
9
22
32
41
314
669
331
992
Less quantifiable data nevertheless suggests that between the 1930's
and 1950's this was happening on a proportionately larger scale among the
Basotho than among any other identifiable group from the black reserves in
South Africa or from South Africa's neighbouring states. Basotho
immigrants, for example, figured disproportionately prominently in the tide
of squatter movements which swept over the Rand immediately following the
Second World War. Three of the major squatter settlements which sprang up
around Johannesburg in the late 1940's were Basotho led and predominantly
Basotho in composition, prompting a bout of ethnic paranoia amongst the
officials of the Johannesburg City Council. 'Apart from the fact that the
vast majority of the participants in these movements are Basuto1, Manager of
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Non-European Affairs, W.J.P. Carr, complained 'the fact emerges that with
one exception ... the leaders have been Basutos, and usually natives who can
be classified as genuine Basutoland tribal natives.' Benoni's Tent Town,
which is the only major squatter camp for which a detailed census appears to
have survived, likewise housed more Basotho from Basutoland than any
discretely identifiable ethnic group. Still more conspicuous was the
number of Basotho women that moved singly and more or less permanently to
the various urban areas of South Africa, and particularly to the Rand. This
is an issue which I have treated more extensively elsewhere, and all that
requires mention at the present juncture is that the concensus among
officials was that this was not paralleled in any other black 'reserve' in
southern Africa.
It is the argument of this paper that it was the scale and rapidity of
this transition from migrant to immigrant status that was responsible for
the development of the Russians but before embarking on that discussion it
is still necessary to pose the prior question 'why was this happening to the
Basotho at this time and at this rate?'.
Economic factors almost certainly provide a central part of the answer.
As Murray, among others, has shown Basutoland's economy entered a period of
deep distress in the early 1930's when the effects of a rapidly climbing
population, mounting land shortage and accellerating soil exhaustion were
compounded by the onset of an unprecedentedly savage drought. Maize
production slumped, never to recover, livestock holdings collapsed, and
Basutoland for the first time turned into a net importer as opposed to a net
exporter of grain. The effects of these pressures were not uniformly felt,
as Murray again is at pains to point out. A growing gulf was developing
between rich and poor households in the territory while within individual
households younger sons were having to wait longer and longer before they
gained independent access to land. As a result the sons of a growing number
of commonomer households had to make do with land holdings of 4 acres or
less while many were unable to enter into even this meagre patrimony until
the age of 35 or more.
Such economic pressures undoubtedly contributed to the growing exodus
of Basotho migrants to South Africa, but they still do not necessarily offer
a complete explanation of why so many of such migrants failed to return.
Other black rural societies which were not conspicuously better off than
Basutoland (e.g. the Transkei and Sekhukhuneland) managed to keep themselves
to a much greater extent intact on the basis of a still viable migrant
labour system. Other factors it would seem need to be taken into account.
One important difference between Basutoland and the rest of the labour
reserves in and around the Union of South Africa was the ease with which a
customarily sanctioned marriage could occur. In contrast to other parts of
the sub-continent where anything between 4 and 12 cattle were normally
demanded as bridewealth, in Basutoland bridewealth levels stood at 20 cattle
or more. Such inflated levels of bridewealth required prospective suitors
to engage in lengthy periods of migrant labour, even when their families
could contribute part of the price. These problems were seriously
exacerbated by the drought of 1932-3, Cattle holdings plunged and had not
recovered their 1921 levels by 1976. Young men had to spend
correspondingly longer periods at work. For many men marriage was deferred
till the age of 30 or 35, which provided an additional disincentive against
return. One alternative to which young men increasingly resorted was the
abduction of brides and the payment of a lesser number of cattle in
compensation. Even then the money for the cattle still had to be earned and
the full price still had to be paid if a husband was to enjoy complete
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rights over his wife and his children. Where the latter did not occur,
migrant husbands once again had less incentive to return. Such problems
served to weaken many migrants' attachments to their families and their
homes, and led to a mounting incidence of deserted wives. Faced with the
prospect of destitution many wives abandoned in this fashion set out
themselves to the employment centres of South Africa either to track down
their absent husbands, or to become independent bread winners themselves,
through petty trading, beer-brewing or prostitution. Once engaged in such
occupations these women were far less likely than their husbands to return
to their homes and rapidly swelled the number of Basotho immigrants to the
Rand. The presence of large numbers of 'unattached' Basotho women on the
Rand, in turn, acted as a further attraction to Basotho migrants on the
Rand. Many established relationships with such women, which even when
impermanent, left them less and less inclined to return home.
A further solvent of Basotho society at this time was the rise of
secondary industry in South Africa especially on the Rand. Between 1933 and
1946 the number of industrial establishments rose from 6 543 to 9 999,
creating a steadily increasing demand for semi-skilled, and, as many argue,
non-migrant labour. These facts are well-known as is the presumed
connection between this and the growth of a permanently settled black urban
population. Yet in the case of Basotho workers, and probably most other
sections of the black working class the connection between industrialisation
and urbanisation was not as direct and mechanistic as most writers
(including myself) have ,previously suggested. Basotho migrants, it is true,
did enter secondary industry in large numbers in this period, and many
proceeded to sever their links with the land, but this had little to do with
the expansion of semi-skilled work. The typical trajectory for Basotho
workers in this period was still to begin their working life by taking a
'join' to the mines (usually straight after their initiation ceremonies were
complete). To begin with this seems to have represented the limit of their
horizons. S. Pelanyane's response to his first job on the mines is in this
respect typical and at first sight confounds conventional wisdom about the
costs and hardships of migrant labour on the mines.
'I wouldn't say I had problems; in fact it was wonderful, earning
some money. At home I would be given five shillings a month and not
even regularly, and now I was earning £3 a month. I thought, hell,
there is a lot of money here in Gauteng .... I mean I could buy
Khakhi trousers for four shillings, a lamb's head for a penny, and
cigarettes for a shilling.'
On this rendering Pelanyane's childhood was relatively prosperous. Most of
his contemporaries went penniless and in rags. For them their first trip to
the mines bestowed a veritable cornucopia of wealth.
After sampling a number of other mines, Pelanyane
'realised that the mines are all the same: you still get the same
old conditions where you stay in the compounds (and), get given the
same bad food.'
He, therefore, decided to look for a better-paying job in the neighbouring
firms. In common with most Basotho ex-miners, Pelanyane's first job was in
the heavy engineering sector shunned by those reared in the towns. The work
was arduous and unskilled and was characterised by an enormously high
turn-over of labour. In this respect it was no different from the bulk of
the jobs open to black workers in secondary industry a good 60% of which
remained unskilled throughout the 1950's. In the case of Pelanyane, and
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countless other Basotho workers - who as a group were in great demand in
heavy industry because of their supposed propensity for hard manual work -
the need for a more stable semi-skilled labour force thus had little to do
with the decision to settle in the towns.
Like many other Basotho workers in secondary industry Pelanyane's entry
was smoothed by the relaxation of the pass laws which took place during the
Second World War. Pelanyane remained unemployed for six months after
leaving the mines, but was still able to live with his brother in the
Asiatic quarter of Benoni without suffering harassment from the police. An
even more common mode of entry into secondary industry employed by Basotho
ex-miners at the time was to sleep at the local pass office until home-boy
networks succeeded in delivering a job.
As with most other new Basotho entrants into industry, there is nothing
to indicate that Pelanyane had any intention of settling permanently in the
towns. That shift seems to have occurred imperceptibly and in an almost
involuntary fashion. To begin with Pelanyane, along with many other of his
fellow workers, retained his links to the countryside, remitting money to
his family and periodically returning home. However, in the face of the
many temptations of urban life, that resolve gradually crumbled away. One
important difference between working in secondary industry and working on
the mines was that no structured mechanisms existed for remitting money back
home, so that there was a built in temptation to allow remittances to falter
or lapse. Urban living also served in other ways1 to hasten the breakdown
of the encapsulated migrant networks that had been sustained on the mines.
A key component of many migrant cultures on the mines was a deep suspicion
of urban life and particularly of urban women. Migrant workers were urged
to keep within relatively closed migrant networks and not to expose
themselves to the physical and moral contamination of the towns. Mpondo,
Xhosa and Pedi migrants who have thus far been most intensively studied seem
to have largely succeeded in this endeavour. Basotho miners by contrast
never sealed themselves off to quite the same extent as their fellow
migrants from these areas. They were prone to gravitate in larger numbers
to the less regulated parts of the urban locations, and seem to have been
disproportionately involved in the urban 'faction fights1 which broke out.
This pattern was reproduced once the Basotho and other ex-miners moved
into secondary industry. While Pedi workers, for example, quarantined
themselves in hostels and succeeded in maintaining their migrant networks
relatively intact, Basotho migrants flooded towards the least controlled
parts of the urban locations, and entered into a variety of temporary or
semi-permanent relations with urban women. Delius and Mayer attribute this
orientation of Pedi and Xhosa migrants to the effectiveness of rural youth
socialisation, particularly through circumcision. Addressing a slightly
different issue, Beinart makes a similar point, viewing the rise of the
Mpondo youth gang, the indlavini as being occasioned by the absence of such
a mechanism to instil respect for traditional hierarchies and values. Yet
even in the absence of circumcision, Mpondo migrants still seem to have
maintained their distance from urban life and to have practiced their gang
activities in the rural areas and in the compounds, as opposed to in the
towns. Conversely, the Basotho, among whom circumcision retained its
traditional vitality became more and more embroiled in urban life and
eventually gave birth to the Russians. Here, the only obvious reason that
can be advanced for the difference is the presence in the urban areas of
ever-growing numbers of 'unattached' Basotho women. It was their presence
which ensured that so many Basotho men were 'lost' to the towns; and it was
their independence which helped generate the gang phenomenon of the
Russians.
Basotho women seem to have figured in almost all the early conflicts of
- 12 -
the Russians. In Vereeniging, Hlalele tells us the conflicts in 1944-47
were prompted when men from Peete's area started 'beating our brothers and
taking our wives'. Those involved, it may be added, were new recruits to
secondary industry, Hlalele himself had recently arrived to work in 'Warm
Pipe' in Vereeniging after leaving Brakpan's State Mines. In Benoni, the
issue was even more clear-cut. Here the Russians were formed by those
Basotho working in secondary industry and living in the Asiatic area of
Benoni expressly for the purpose of retaining control over their women in
the face of Basotho intruders from the mines. In response, as we have seen,
the miners formed thier own gang, the Japanese. The genesis of the Russians
at the intersection between migrant and immigrant ways of life could not be
more plain. Within this context, however, the immigrant element soon became
ascendent. The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed a massive and
ongoing exodus of workers into secondary industry from the mines, spurred on
by the suppression of the 1946 strike, and in the Near East Rand by the
closure of several mines. Between 1946 and 1948 the numbers of Basotho
miners on the Rand dropped from 55 136 to 27 672 after having stood at
47 029 in 1936. The number of Basotho workers in secondary industry, by
contrast, had grown to 23 578 in 1946 and were rapidly climbing up.
Thus, by early 1948 the Japanese were already based in Benoni's squatter
camp, Tent Town, rather than on the mines and the centre of gravity of the
conflict had shifted decisively to the towns. It was perhaps an implicit
recognition of this that persuaded the Japanese to relinquish their name,
and to fight instead over the possession of the common name, the Russians.
The sudden surge of immigration to the towns during and immediately
after the Second World War soon led to a desperate shortage of housing, and
prompted a series of squatter movements to spring up all over the Rand. The
growth of a settled Basotho immigrant community, and the evolution of the
Russians was intimately caught up with this development. One of the many
ironies of this period is that once the Nationalist government had accepted
the need to stabilise a significant portion of its black urban population
it poured the bulk of its available resources into 'site and service'
programmes for ex-squatter settlements and thereafter so called 'economic
housing schemes', and for a period neglected hostel construction. Access
to accommodation either in the old site and service settlements or the new
economic housing schemes was conditional on being married, which placed many
migrants in the indivious position of striking up a temporary relationship
with a woman in the towns or finding space in either illegal or highly
congested accommodation elsewhere. Some groups (like sections of the Pedi
and Zulu) managed to negotiate this transition by staking out claims in the
overcrowded company and municipal hostels that were dotted across the Rand,
within which they continued to insulate their lives from the corrosive
influences of the towns. Basotho migrants, by contrast, needed no bidding
to flood into the site and service settlements and the other less controlled
residential areas of the Rand. Liaisons contracted in the course of such a
move, often no doubt intended as temporary, acted as an additional drain on
the migrant's resolve to maintain links with his home,while the generally
less encapsulated urban living drove further bridgeheads into the migrant
cultures which had been fashioned on the mines.
Within this new environment two new arenas of conflict emerged, the
first in the squatter settlements, the second in the less controlled black
residential areas such as the black freehold areas of Newclare and Evaton,
and the Asiatic section of Benoni. While Basotho women were generally as
fulsome in their tributes to the squatter leaders as the rest of the camps'
female populations, their menfolk were often much less keen. 'The Russians
refused to join Mpanza', Rantoa tells us
'because it was clearly stated that we did not have to join somebody
because he had done something good for us.'
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The basic problem was that they were in competition for the same things.
Whereas the squatter leaders levied fees to administer the camps they set
up, the Russians exacted contributions to cover their legal costs. Whereas
one of the principal functions of the squatter leaderships was to police the
communities that they had founded, the Russians insisted on administering
their own brand of rough justice themselves. Finally, whereas many
'unattached' Sotho women saw the camps and their leaders as a means of
gaining a measure of security independent of men, one of the principal
objects of the Russians was to re-establish male control. Except where
Russian leaders set up their own squatter settlements, violent struggles for
ascendency could scarcely be avoided. Mention has already been made of the
bloody Christmas Day battle in Orlando Shelters in 1950, but our best
documented example comes from the squatter settlement of Tent Town near
Benoni. Founded by a Mpanza-like figure called Harry Mabuya in 1945, it
soon became the centre of the so-called Japanese gang as they moved off
Benoni's mines. From then on Tent Town found itself repeatedly the scene of
violent conflicts first between the Japanese and the Russians and then
between the Molopo and Matsieng. As the level of violence heightened it
also found itself subject to forced levies of money to pay for the Russian's
legal defence. Not surprisingly this resolved itself into a battle for
control. Mpanza and his committee set up a civilian guard comprising mostly
of Xhosa in 1950, and then took the decision to take the battle to their
opponents' camp. Molapo leader, Pokone, recalls
'He (Maboya) came along with his civil guards to my tent. He wanted
by blood, but he couldn't find me. You see, I knew they wanted to
strike that day. As they were busy destroying my tent, I was
watching with my boys. I was in hiding. He was commanding while in
his car and focussing his lights on my tent.'
However, neither Maboya nor the Xhosa were any match for the Russians and
after a violent battle in which they were heavily defeated the Russians
again enjoyed a free run of the camp.
An analogous set of conflicts emerged in the Asiatic area of Benoni and
the black freehold township of Newclare. One of the first conflicts in
Benoni, in which a distinctively (though proto-) 'Russian' flavour was
present, occurred in 1945, when Basotho migrants and immigrants fought a
pitched battle against African 'watchmen' of Indian houses and rented
shanties, and against other black residents of the area. Control over
space, to all appearances, underlay this battle, which seems to have been
shot through with a strong resident/immigrant tension. A similar set of
causes appear responsible for the rise of tension in Newclare township,
which erupted in protracted conflict between 1950 and 1957, which there is
no space to discuss in any detail here. To sum up then control over space
and accommodation in a period or rapid immigration was a major concern of
the Russians, and was a factor in many of the more bloody clashes in which
they were embroiled.
An Anatomy
The Russians emerged out of a transition from migrant to immigrant life
on the Rand. In common with other migrant societies, their lifestyle and
practices were inbued with rural values, and their identities were
powerfully stamped by their experiences of rural youth socialisation.
Virtually every single Russian interviewed for this study saw a clear
continuity between their experiences as herdboys and initiates and their
later activities as Russians on the Rand. Maliehe Khoeli is among the most
unequivocal in this respect.
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'Borashea is almost the same thing as lehlankana-poonyane in which a
dispute would arise between the boys from one village and those from
other villages over grazing rights in the mohoang .... In the
mohoang, the boys whose cattle have arrived first would deny those
who came late to the grazing rights and they would beat and strike,
one another. This is what is called haneli (do not graze here).'
Much of the Russian identity was defined by these experiences. The
Russians en the Reef were, above all, a fighting machine, and they used the
martial skills that they had learnt in their youth to defend new kinds of
resources which were a source of dispute - notably, women and urban space.
To join the Russians there was no elaborate induction or training. The only
laws were to
'respond to the whistle, don't rob wives (of other gang members) and
obedience to the committee.'
Both membership and advancement depended in large measure on the capacity to
fight, and since 'fighting was a skill learned through fighting and nothing
else', the Russians recruited from those whose boyhood experiences had
taught them how to fight. Both factions were made up of those whose
background was that 'of looking after cattle and fighting with sticks'.
Eastern Orange Free State Basotho would generally be allowed to join
'because they herded cattle and automatically had experience of fighting'
but rarely anyone else. An occasional Pedi, Tswana or Hlubi would be
permitted to enlist, but according to Molapo sources, this was more of a
Matsieng practice, on which, they imply, they looked down.
Founded on migrancy and fighting the Russians were informed by a strong
ethnic sentiment which played a significant role in shaping and hardening
ethnic identities on the Reef. Russians associated with fellow Basotho,
whom they knew primarily from their own region, or whom they had met on the
mines. This latter experience seems to have been particularly influential
in forging a chauvinistic ethnic identity. Russian exclusivity and the
attacks which they inflicted on others engendered a strong anti-Basotho
backlash among many other sections of the Reef's urban population, which was
most strikingly apparent in Newclare in the early 1950's, when anyone making
the mistake of wearing a blanket or speaking Sesotho was a likely target of
robbery or assault by tsotsis and/or the civilian guard. The Russians
conversely sought to draw all Basotho living in Newclare into their orbit,
if not into their own ranks. Even where actively hostile to the Russians,
other Basotho residents were levied for contributions and subjected to great
pressure to move from non-Basotho neighbourhoods to the Basotho stronghold
of Sitekekeng. A similar process of ethnic polarisation - often under
duress - can be traced in Germiston, Benoni and Evaton. In Benoni and
Germiston the Basotho clashed repeatedly with those they defined as 'Zulu',
'Xhosa' and 'Mpondo' creating a deep chasm of hostility and misunderstanding
with the groups, which even those Basotho who sought to stand aloof from the
fighting found it difficult to bridge. Two points of a wider significance
emerge from this discussion: firstly the role of communities moving along
an axis from migrant to immigrant in urban areas in defining and hardening
ethnic divisions, and secondly, the role of ethnic gangs in providing the
nucleus and thrust for the growth of destructive ethnic chauvinisms.
Neither issue has been accorded much attention in the literature, including
the recent collection on African ethnicity edited by Vail. Nevertheless,
if one examines the Russians in the context of the studies by Phimister and
van Onselen in Zimbabwe, and Troup and Tamarkin in Kenya, they suggest an
urban root to ethnicity "high has a much greater importance than has
hitherto been acknowledged.
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While migrant in origin, the Russians were also strongly immigrant and
proletarian in character and composition. Rantoa remarks:
'We had three parts. Some tailors (and) gamblers, others on contract
(in the factories), others on the mines.'
By far the largest of these categories were those living and employed in the
towns. The preponderance of Russian leaders were working in secondary
industry (much of it heavy), with the balance self-employed, mainly in
tailoring. Their membership, while being regularly replenished and
re-inforced from the mines was likewise employed for the most part in
secondary industry. This proletarian aspect is reflected in their weekly
calendar. Fights - and dances, the other principal Russian entertainment -
were confined to the week-ends. In between, Molapo and Matiseng faction
members fraternised happily with each other in the firms.
An unexpected feature of the Russians which marks them off sharply from
other urban-based migrant associations was their complete absence of concern
for their members' families back home. If a member was killed during battle
they would collect money to buy a coffin and to pay for his funeral, but
would not even bother to notify his wife back home. Nothing could
underline more clearly the immigrant perspective of the organisation and of
the people that joined. One reflection of this proletarian and immigrant
character was that the Russians were overwhelmingly adult in composition.
No age cohort dominated, certainly not the youth. Khoeli observes '... it
was completely mixed. There was no majority of older or younger people' a
profile which the court records confirm. Thus, while emerging out of a
youth culture, the Russians, unlike many other gangs on the Rand, in no
sense constituted a youth sub-culture themselves.
The immigrant and proletarian character of the Russians also found
expression in the internal structure of the organisation. Leadership was
based wholly on merit, which was decided primarily by fighting ability, but
also by oratory, strategic capacity or guile. No sons of chiefs figured
among the leadership of any Russian gangs, and the few that were ordinary
members are remembered by name. Leaders were elected, but were allowed to
appoint their close lieutenants; among a committee of eight (Deputy,
treasurer, vice-treasurer, secretary, vice-secretary and three additional
members, including the whistle-blowers). The leader and his lieutenants
would take day to day decisions but key issues were referred to the
membership at general meetings which took place on the week-ends. At these,
the leaders' authority could at any time be revoked, but this often caused
division in the gangs, sometimes leading to outright secession. Gangs
consisted of anything from 50 to 400 core members but no clear hierarchy
existed among the various gangs scattered across the Reef. Newclare and
Benoni were the most important centres, and Hlalele claims that Newclare was
the headquarters of the Matsieng and that he was overall chief. A degree
of precedence may have been accorded, and gangs from one area usually
responded to a call for support from another, but there was no clear
obligation that this should occur. The Russians could thus be better
likened to a confederacy than an empire but one which could act swiftly and
effectively when the occasion demanded, as most of the opponents could
attest.
The Russians practiced a kind of qualified democracy, but this came to
an abrupt halt where women were concerned. Women had no say in Russian
councils, played no part in Russian gangs and were viewed primarily as
objects to be kept under control. In Russian eyes Basotho women, having
tasted independence, were mercenary and fickle. 'Women at that time were
enticed by money' Pelanyana asserts. 'If you had money you could have as
many women as you wanted', and this is a sterotype that recurs in both
vernacular literature and oral testimony. One of the principal objects of
the Russians was thus to keep women under control. Where women absconded
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A very similar, though shorter lived, conflagration flared up in
Germiston in December 1955. There a Civilian Guard was set up with close
links to the local branch of the ANC. Conflict quickly broke out between it
and the local
every tsotsi
Again a similar logic may well have been at work, although fewer details are
known.
=  Russians, which according to the municipal report 'brought
3  from far and wide to flock to the Civil Guard's banner'.
On this evidence the Russians were hostile to the kind of politics
represented by the ANC, but this did not mean that they were entirely
a-political. The Newclare leader Hlalele told a Drum reporter in 1952 'We
don't want anything to do with the Congress - we come from Basutoland, which
is a Protectorate and we don't belong to the Union' and this suggests a
useful insight into the Russian's mentality. Despite their immigrant
position they still thought of themselves as extra South African and had not
entirely abandoned hope of eventually returning home. Their politics
reflected this ambivalence and could thus as easily be centred on Basutoland
as the Rand. Rantoa indeed claims that at some point in the early 1950's,
the Matsieng faction of the Russians was drawn under the wing of the main
nationalist party in Basutoland, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).
How much substance there is to this claim requires further exploration, and
it must remain for the moment in the realm of interesting speculation.
In any case if one wishes to identify the politics of the Russians one
probably needs to conceive of politics in a somewhat broader way. Beinart
considers the indlavini political because they challenged rural structures
of authority, and a similar argument could be applied to the Russians.
Although they manipulated the police and were manipulated in turn they
nevertheless constituted one of the most serious and enduring challenges to
police control on the Rand. In specific circumstances, but in a quite
fundamental fashion, they would simply repudiate police authority. M.M.,
for example is not a-typical:
'The police I fought for a long time till they retreated and ran
away, shooting at me and I returning the fire back. They would let
loose dogs and we would hit them. The reason is that we did not want
the police to reach us. If they [did] they would want to search us
and find our pistols or revolvers or things like axes and swords.
When they found them they confiscated them and arrested you. We did
not agree to that so we signed to the effect that we should kill or
be killed because we know that we are going to jail.'
Even in the event of being arrested the Russians were exceptionally
difficult to convict. Russians hired the best legal advice, and many
(most?) Russian gangs had attornies and advocates on permanent retainer whom
they could call on at any time day and night. Huge sums of money changed
hands as bail or legal fees, and M.M. talks on one occasion of furnishing
bail of Rl 000 each for 60 men after one particularly bloody massed
fight. While Russians had great respect for their lawyers they had
little respect for the rest of the apparatus of the law. On one occasion
much savoured by Rantoa and confirmed in the Rand Daily Mail the Matsieng
faction attacked Malapo prisoners as they were standing trial in Benoni
Magistrate's Court in 1947, forcing the magistrate and all the officers of
the court into panicky flight. Three years later the Russians attacked
and released the Molapo leader Matsarapane, after he had been convicted of
the murder of a white police sergeant in Tent Town, Benoni as he was being
taken back in the train from the Springs courts to Boksburg gaol.
Matsorapane was spirited away by taxi to Basutoland (other Russians likewise
had fleets of taxis on retainer) only to be rearrested three months later
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(and subsequently hanged) when he made the mistake of returning to South
Africa. Slightly less dramatic examples of contempt and defiance of the
law could be multiplied many times over and it is a tribute to Russian guile
and duplicity that they could manipulate the police at all.
By way of concluding this paper a note of caution should be sounded.
Russian gangs did not always conform to an idential pattern but varied over
space and over time. Many Russians admit that even from the beginning a
section of their membership were little more than common criminals and
thieves. As time went on, most old timer Russians agree, the behaviour of
'the younger generation1 grew steadily worse. M.M. lends some credence to
these claims, when asserting that his (Masupha) faction in Newclare
introduced the use of pistols and revolvers on a much larger scale than
earlier on (something confirmed in the police record) and would happily kill
a fallen opponent, which, as Rantoa and others make clear, had been
something frowned on before. By the late 1950's and early 1960's it is also
apparent that the Russians' wings were slowly being clipped. The closer
policing of passes as well as other aspects of urban life left them much
less rooom to manoervre. It should not be thought, nevertheless, that the
Russians now constitute no more than an historical byway or curiosity for as
recently as January 19th a newspaper report speaks of 'violence last
week-end (in Carletonville's township) between youths and a vigilante group
known as the "Russians" who activists claim are working with the police'.
One can only imagine what complex dynamics this conceals.
